Position: Head of the Main Department of Communications and Information Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2014-2019.
The sphere of corrupt activity: tender purchases.
Region of corrupt activity : Kyiv.
Qualification: Suspicion has not yet been presented.
Status: On May 13, 2024, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau conducted searches of the former chief of communications forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - former head of the Main Directorate of Communications and Information Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Volodymyr Rapka, and the former head of the Department of Automation Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the matter of the automated army management system " Call-AC".
Story of the case: At the end of April, NABU detectives searched Volodymyr Rapko's residence and found a mobile phone there. It revealed correspondence with the former head of the Department of Automation Development of the Armed Forces, the former beneficial owner of Everest Limited LLC, as well as others. The specified phone is recognized as physical evidence.
According to the investigation, military employees of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, military representative offices and employees of Everest Limited LLC could seize and appropriate budget funds in the course of fulfilling the terms of the state contract under the state defense order for the research and development work of the Dzvin-AS cipher.
According to the investigation, military employees of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, military representative offices and employees of Everest Limited LLC could seize and appropriate budget funds in the course of fulfilling the terms of the state contract under the state defense order for the research and development work of the Dzvin-AS cipher.
In 2016, the military ordered an armed forces management system from Everest Limited LLC. 4 years and 600 million UAH of budget funds were spent on development. But the audit revealed so many flaws and problems in "Dzvoni-AS", that is the name of the system, that its implementation in the army may turn out to be completely impractical and impossible.
According to the contract, "Everest" was supposed to perform the research and development work of "DZVIN-AS". Its essence was to create an automated system of the center of operational management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In simple words - military management systems. In the end, "Everest" had to do two main things: write specialized military software and equip several control points (headquarters and machines) with the equipment on which this software works.
It is interesting that before "DZVONU" the company did not develop similar software, its main activity was trading in computers, accessories and ready-made software. Therefore, at first, even the Ministry of Defense concluded that the company was unable to perform the work. But in a few weeks, they changed their minds dramatically - if Everest attracts co-performers, then it is possible, and the contract was signed.
The work on the project lasted 4 years, during which time the estimate grew, because the customer and the contractor constantly changed the plan and scope of work. In particular, the technical specifications were corrected 12 times, which led to constant adjustments to the working and design documentation. For this adjustment alone, as for a separate piece of work, Everest was paid 115 million UAH (this is 20% of the total cost of the project). The cost of DZVON increased by another 255 million UAH because officials decided to triple the number of control points that Everest was to equip, and instead of the planned 4 complexes, 12 were purchased. The auditors never found a reasonable explanation for why the number was increased to 12. In the end, 580 million UAH were already paid for DZVIN.
In the summer of 2020, a few months before the project was handed over, the SBU initiated an audit, first a financial one, and then in the fall a comprehensive audit of the project as a whole. The general conclusion of the audit is as follows: the software does not meet the task set, therefore, further use of "Dzvon" may be impractical at all, and the purchase of as many as 12 complexes is not justified in any way, so accordingly, the overpayment of 255 million may have been unnecessary.
At the end of 2022, the automated combat control system "Dzvin-AS" was adopted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
According to the audit, "DZVIN" was to become the main element of the Unified Automated Management System of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was to provide automated information collection and processing, operational data exchange, the same operational decision-making and task execution, work with a digital map, protected security contours, compatibility with NATO and much more. However, according to the results of the software analysis, some of these things have not been implemented, some have been implemented in a way that will not ensure effective and operational management of the army:
1. "DZVIN" is incompatible with similar systems of NATO member states. Compatibility at the level of troop control systems is necessary for the coordinated work of allies during combat operations, it ensures operational information exchange. For compatibility with NATO, it is enough to use information exchange protocols approved by NATO. But for unknown reasons, "DZVIN" was written using an experimental protocol that was not ratified as a NATO standard. According to the technical specifications, the software was supposed to provide information interaction with NATO in accordance with MIP (JC3IEDM). Current NATO standards are published annually in the NISP document (NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles). JC3IEDM is indeed indicated in the current list of standards (see the document below). Instead, "DZVON" used the ADEM (Alternative Development and Exchange Method) specification, one of the trial options that was not approved as a NATO standard. From 2016 to the present, throughout all the years of work on the "DZVIN" project, ADEM has not been mentioned in any NISP.
2. The absence of open programming interfaces in "ZZONA" according to international standards complicates the further integration of the system with other software in the Unified Management System of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or any other product in the future, if they are written according to international standards. This creates the risk of further additional costs for the constant refinement of the system with adapter codes for each new software.
3. Work with digital maps is implemented in such a way that “DZVIN” will not be able to provide effective work during combat operations. The map is one of the most important tools for the military, it should provide situational awareness, that is, understanding the current situation on the battlefield, and therefore the information on it should be updated promptly. Instead, it turned out that the basis of “DZVIN” is a document management system, therefore, work with maps is done like work with documents. According to the auditors, such a system simplifies work with documents, therefore it can be effective for planning or preparation, but during active combat operations it will not be able to provide the army with situational awareness.
4. The classifications in the system are assigned not to individual documents/data, but to entire control points, which makes it impossible to exchange data quickly and automatically. From the headquarters with the “DSK” level to the higher headquarters with the “secret”/“top secret” level (i.e. upwards), information is still automatically transmitted, but vice versa (downwards) – no longer, only manually. For this, the headquarters has three different servers, one for each access level, and a separate person, the so-called “security administrator”, must transfer data from one to another on a flash drive and only in this way will they get to the “lower” headquarters. In conditions of active combat operations, the rate of information transfer and decision-making essentially depends on how quickly the flash drives are switched. Let us recall that “DZVIN” was supposed to be an automated control system.
In February 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office reported suspicions to former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Radian Tymoshenko, and former Chief of the Signal Corps of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Rapko, in the case of the automated system "Dzvin".
SAPO and NABU have exposed a large-scale corruption scheme in the defense sector, due to which the state lost over UAH 246 million. This concerns the embezzlement of budget funds during the creation of the automated system of the Operational Management Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Dzvin". Among the suspects: former deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, lieutenant general; former chief of the Signal Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, major general; former head of the Automation Development Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, colonel; director of a private company - the main executor of the contract
According to the investigation, in 2016, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract for the development of the system with a company that had no experience in creating either troop control systems or specialized software. Over 4 years of research and development work, the technical specifications for the system were illegally changed 13 times, which increased the cost of the work by 300 million UAH, and reduced the functionality of the system by dozens of times. More than 115 million UAH was spent on unjustified documentation corrections alone.
As the SAPO and NABU found out, the developed system does not meet the technical requirements at all: from incompatibility with NATO protocols to lack of integration with other military systems. During the investigation, detectives and prosecutors encountered attempts to hinder the investigation: the individuals involved in the scheme began to hide key documentation regarding the financing and development of the project. After the investigation began, they accelerated the work and even modernized the system for free, trying to make it more similar to the original design. However, due to fundamental errors in the architecture, it is impossible to further improve the "Dzvin" system
As reported by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), four suspects were informed of suspicions of violating Part 5 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
In March 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court applied a preventive measure in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million with the assignment of duties to the former Chief of the Signal Troops of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Rapko, in the case of abuses during the development of the automated system "Dzvin".
This was reported by the press service of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, but did not mention the name of the suspect.
According to media reports, this is specifically about Rapko, whose home was previously searched in this case.
On March 4, 2025, the investigating judge of the Supreme Administrative Court supported the position of the SAPO prosecutor and applied a preventive measure to the former chief of the Armed Forces Signal Corps, suspected of embezzling budget funds during the creation of the automated system of the Armed Forces Operational Command Center "Dzvin". The court partially satisfied the motion of the NABU detectives, agreed with the SAPO prosecutor, and applied a preventive measure to the major general in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million
The suspect was also given the following obligations: to arrive at the first call; not to leave the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region without permission; to report any change in his place of residence and work; to refrain from communicating with other suspects in the case and witnesses regarding the circumstances set forth in the report of suspicion; to hand over his foreign passports and wear an electronic bracelet.
Individuals potentially involved in Volodymyr Rapko's schemes:
- Viktor Artikhovich, head of the Department of Automation Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2018-2020, from whom a phone and laptops were seized during the search. On the equipment, detectives found chats and correspondence regarding the circumstances of the case, in particular, regarding the procedure for carrying out the research and development of the automated command and control system "Dzvin-AS" and other data.
- Viktor Byvalkevych, head of military unit No. 2461. During the search, his mobile phone, laptop, and documents were seized.
- Mykhailo Didovets, head of the department for organizing the use of automated systems of the Automation Development Department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His phone, laptop, and documentation were seized.
In March 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court applied a preventive measure in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million to the former Director of the Automation Development Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Viktor Artikhovych, in the case of the automated system "Dzvin".
The petition is partially granted. A preventive measure in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million is applied to the suspect Artikhovych Viktor Mykolayovych.
The court also imposed the following obligations on Artikhovych: to appear at the first summons; not to leave Kyiv and Kyiv region without permission; to report any change of residence and work; to refrain from communicating with other suspects and witnesses; to surrender his foreign passports and wear an electronic bracelet. The obligations are valid until May 11.
In addition, the HACC applied a preventive measure in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million to Yuri Pastukhov, the director of Everest Limited LLC, in a case of abuse during the development of the automated "Dzvin" system for the troops.
This was reported by the press service of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, without specifying the name of the suspect. According to media reports, it is about Pastukhov.
On March 10, 2025, the investigating judge of the Supreme Judicial Council partially satisfied the request of the NABU detectives, approved by the SAPO prosecutor, and applied a preventive measure to the director of the private company in the form of a bail of UAH 2 million.
The court also imposed the following procedural obligations on the suspect: to arrive at the first summons; not to leave the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region without permission; to report a change in his place of residence and work; to refrain from communicating with other suspects in the case and witnesses regarding the circumstances set forth in the report of suspicion; to hand over his foreign passports and wear an electronic bracelet.
Scandals : The media is unaware of this.
Persons who were supposed to respond to Volodymyr Rapko's corruption schemes: In the case of Volodymyr Rapko, law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor's office are still working.
Assets: Apartment in Brovary 66 square meters, residential building in Brovary 58 square meters and land plot of 1.3 acres, residential building in Brovary 69 and land plot of 24 acres, apartment in Lviv Region 78 square meters, apartment in Kyiv 23 square meters, garden house in Odesa, 52 square meters, land share in Vinnytsia region, 10 hectares. Hyundai Santa Fe car, salary in the General Staff 1.6 million UAH, 2 million UAH in cash.
Sources:
Unified state register of declarations
NABU conducted a search of the former chief of communications forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine